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MIAMI LAW QUARTER.,Y
juror's testimony to facts evidencing outside influence, but he cannot testi-
fy that such outside influence affected his verdict."5
In the instant case, the juror remained silent when the verdict of guilty
was read aloud in open court. If he objected to such verdict, that was time
to be heard." The Supreme Court said that matters presented in the juror's
affidavit showed it essentially inhered in the verdict itself," and was inad-
missible. Florida follows the general rule," except as to matters which do
not inhere in the verdict," or as otherwise provided by statute.20
The universal adoption of the rule has been a matter of public policy
which seeks to preserve the stability of the courts. "Such evidence, though
not irrelevant, must be excluded, since experience has shown it is more
likely to prevent than promote the discovery of truth"." Not to refuse jurors
testimony is a dangerous principle to follow. It permits tampering with jur-
ors. By various and improper influences,, affidavits could be obtained from
jurors upon which to ground motions for new trials in almost every case.2 '
It is conceded the rule leaves something to be desired since some persons
may become the victims of chance or mistake. However, it is better than to
introduce a rule which could be productive of infinite mischief, whereby no
verdict could be permitted to stand." in Perry v. Bailey, "Justice Brewer
said:
When a juror is heard to impeach his own verdict because of some
matter resting in his own consciousness, the power is given him to
nullify the expressed conclusions under oath of himself and eleven
others.
Paul M. Low
SEARCH AND SEIZURE-STATUTORY AUTHORITY
TO SEARCH WITHOUT WARRANT
Defendant's license was suspended when gambling implements were
found on the premises. The licensee instituted a certiorari proceeding to
quash the order, on grounds that the evidence had been procured as a result
15. State v. McKay, 63 Nev. 118, 165 P.2d 389 (1946).
16. United States v. Nystrornm, 116 F.Supp. 771 (W.D. Pa. 1953); State v. Pollock
57 Ariz.415, 114 P.2d 249 (1941); Lawson v. Com., 278 Ky. 1, 127 S.W.2d 879
(1939); State v. Priestley, 97 Utah 158, 91 P.2d 447 (1939).
17. Brackin v. State, 31 Ala. App. 228, 14 So.2d 383 (1943); Linsley v. State, 88
Fla. 135, 101 So. 173 (1924).
18. Ibid.
19. Turner v. State, 130 Fla. 801, 178 So. 833 (1930); Linsley v. State, 88 Fln
135, 101 So. 273 (1924); Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan.539 (1874).
20. FLA. STAT. 1 920.04; see note 8, supra; and FLA. STAT. 5 .920.05, which
provides that misconduct of jurors is grounds for motion for new trial.
21. Blodgett v. Park, 76 N.H. 435,84 Art. 42, Ann.Cas. 19138, 853 (1912).
22. Norris v. State, see note 6, sapra.
23. Tyler v. Steven, see note 6, supra.
24. 12 Kan. 539 (1874).
CASENOTES
of unreasonable, illegal, and unlawful search and seizure. Held, the im-
port of the statute' is plain that the commission had authority to enter and
inspect the premises without a search warrant and that the censurable con-
duct and language of the inspector did not make the entire inspection il-
legal. In re Smith, 74 So.2d 353 (Fla. 1954).
Few principles of our jurisprudence have been less appreciated or more
the object of virulent contention than the doctrine which protects the citi-
zen from unreasonable search and seizure. The question of how far past
the strict limits of the statute an officer can go before his action is void
because of infringment of constitutional guaranties, of the defendant de-
pends on the reasonableness of the search.' The term "unreasonable search
and seizure" is not defined in the FederalP and Florida ' Constitutions,
and in Milan v United States6, the phrase was said to have no fixed, abso-
lute, or unchanging meaning. The Supreme Court has recently said that the
relevant test of whether or not a search is reasonable depends upon the
facts and circumstances-the total atmosphere of the case.' Since the right
of search and seizure is in derogation of constitutional guaranties,' the sta-
tute authorizing or regulating searches must be strictly construed against
the state' and liberally construed in favor of the individual."' In Solomon
v. State," the statute vested in the sheriff the right to Iforcibly' enter a
house without a warrant if he had good reason to believe gambling was
being conducted. It was held that the search was illegal because it was
conducted by a deputy sheriff. An Idaho case,'
2 wherein a statute provided
for the search of a place where there was probable cause to believe that
intoxicating liquor was sold, held that the authority of an officer to search
a certain place cannot be extended so as to constitute authority to search
a person not connected in any way with the place being searched, and who
1. FLA. STAT. § 511.11 (1953).
2. U.S. CONST. Amend. IV.
3. District of Columbia v. Little,178 F. 2d 13 (D.C. Cit. 1949). (The constitut-
ional prohibition against unreasonable searches, by implication, permit, reasonable
searches); Church v. State, 151 Fla. 24 9 So. 2d 164 (1942).
4. Agnello v.'U.S., 290 Fed. 671 (2d Cir. 1923).
5. FLA. CONST. Declaration of Rights § 22.
6. 296 Fed. 629 (4th Cir. 1924).
7. U.S. v. Rabinowtiz, 339 U.S. 46 (1950); Drayton v. U.S., 205 F.2d 35 (5th Cit.
1953); U.S. v. Hill,114 F. Supp.
44 1 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Brinegar v. State, 262 P.2d
464, (Okl.1953).
8. State v. Jones, 358 Mo. 398, 214 S.W. 2d 705 (1948).
9. Wilson v. Quigg,154 Fla.348, 17 So. 2d 697 (1944); Gildrie v. State,94 Fla.134,
113 So. 704 (1929); accord, Hart v. State, 89 Fla. 202, 103 So. 633 (1925); Jackson
v. State,87 Fla. 262, 99 So. 548 (1924); Edwards v. State, 83 Okl.Crim. 340, 177
P.2d 143 (1947).
10. Sgno v. U.S., 287 U.S. 206 Q923); accord, U.S. v. Nichols, 89 F.Supp. 935
(D.C. Ark. 1950); Marron v. U.S., 275 U.S. 192(1927); Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616
(1886).
11. 115 Fla. 310, 156 So. 401 (1934).
12. Purkey v. Mabey, 33 Idaho 281, 193 Pac. 79 (1920); accord. Town v. Beam, 104
S. C. 146, 88 S. E. 441 (1919); ef., State v. Kollat, 190 Wis 255, 208 N.W. 900
(1926).
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merely happens io be on the premises. However, it has been stated that the
statute should not be construed so strictly as to thwart reasonable and pro-
per efforts to detect crime." In Commonwealth v Courtney," officers while
making a search committed acts not authorized by the warrant. The court
held that all that was done was not tainted with illegality, and that the acts
were illegal only to the extent that they were not authorized by the war-
rant. Again, in a federal case," it was held that there was an unlawful
destruction of liquor, but this did not make unlawful the seizure of property
which could rightfully be taken.
The Supreme Court bases its decision in the instant case upon the ruling
of In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor Florida,", where the Court pre-
viously said that the Hotel Commission has authority to go upon the prem-
ises of the establishments and inspect them without a search warrant for
the purpose of determining whether or not any law with reference to the
hotel, including the gambling laws, were being violated. The majority of
the Court admits that the inspecting officials are charged with the duty of
exercising care to see that no abuse or unnecessary severity occurs," but
they adopt the underlying principle of Commonwealth v Courtney.- The dis-
sent, on the other hand, admits that some flexibility of judgment on the
part of officers is necessary in carrying out justice, but that considering
the facts and circumstances, ' the search was unreasonable. By these con-
flicting opinions we can see two somewhat opposed views in cases of
search and seizure. One view adheres to the principle that the state has a
duty to protect its citizens in enjoyment of privileges and immunities as
guaranteed by the constitution.20 The other view is that the state also has
a duty to prevent and suppress unlawful conduct.,,
13. Pong Ying v. U.S., 66 F. 2d 67 (3rd Cir. 1930); accord, U.S. v. Snow, 9 F.2d978 (D.C. Mass. 1925);c/.. Perry v. State, 72 OkI.Crim. 149, 114 P. 2d 185 (1929);
Wagner v. State, 72 OkI. Crim. 393, 117 P.2d 162 (1941).
14. 243 Mass. 363, 138 N.E. 16 (1923); accord, Adams v. N.Y., 192 U.S. 585
(1904); Quandt Brewing Co. v. U.S., 47 F.2d 199 (2d Cir. 1931); Commonwealth v.Intoxicating Liquors, 203 Mass. 585,89 N.E. 918 (1909); cf., State v. Brown, 91
W.Va. 709, 114 S.E. 372 (1922).
15. McGuire v. U.S., 273 U.S. 95 (1926); accord. Giacolone v. U.S., 13 F.2d
108 (9th Cir. 1926); Hurley v. U.S., 300 Fed. 75 (1st Cir. 1924); In re Quirk, 1
F. 2d 484 (D.C. N.Y. 1924).
16. 63 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1953).
17. Marshall v. Commonwealth, 140 Va. 542, 125 S.E. 329, (1924); accord,McMahan's Admi'x v. Droffen, 242 Ky. 785, 47 S.E. 2d 716 (1932); cf.. State v. Frye,
58 Ariz. 409, 120 P.2d 793 (1942); Girard v. Anderson, 219 Iowa 142, 257 N.W. 400
(1934); Krebbeil v. Henkle, 142 Iowa 677, 121 N.W. 378 (1909).
18. See note 14 supra.
19. Mathews v. Correa, 135 F. 2d 534( 1934); U.S. v. Hotchkiss 60 F.Supp. 405 (D.C. 1.d. 1945); U.S. v. Fsposito, 45 FSupp. 39 (D.C. Pa. 1942);Lango
v. State, 157 Fla. 668, 26 So. 2d 819 (1946); Buckley v. Beaulieu, 104 Maine 56,71 Ad. 70 (1908); Cleek v. State, 192 Tenn. 457, 241 S.W. 2d 529 (1951); accor,Ellis v. State, 92 Fla. 275, 109 So. 622 (1926); Haile v. Gardner, 82 Fla. 355,91
So. 376 (1921).
20. Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 384 (1941); Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616 (1886); accord,Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152,224 S.W. 860 (1921); cf., Manning v. Rob-
erts, 179 Ky. 550, 200 S.W. 937 (1918).
21. Angello v. U.S., 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Carrol v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132 (1925);Elliot v. Haskin, 20 Cal. App. 2d 591, 67 P.2d 698 (1937); accord, Tranum v.
Stlinger, 216 Ala. 522, 113 So. 541 (1927).
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It is respectfully submitted that the Florida Supreme Court, in weighing
these two principles, may have placed too much emphasis on the protection
of the public welfare to the detriment of an individual's constitutional
right. There is no question that a reasonable inspection of apartment
houses, restaurants, and hotels is necessary for the protection of public
welfare.3' But laws which authorize such inspections must respect the
individual's guaranties against unreasonable search and seizure.
Since the "reasonable" test depends upon the facts and circumstances-"
the total atmosphere of the case, ", and since this Court has held that a
statute which purports to delegate authority to certain officers be strictly
construed, 1 it is difficult to say that when a state officer commits a physi-
cal assult on an individual and subjects him to verbal abuse that the search
was reasonable."5 Certainly, no broad power bestowed upon the law enforce-
ment officer warrants an assault upon the person. As Justice Brandeis so
ably stated:
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government offi-
cials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are com-
mands of the citizen.... To declare that the government may com-
mit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private criminal
would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine




An unlawfully employed minor attempted to sue at law for injuries sus-
tained in the course of the employment. Held, the minor is limited to an
exclusive remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Winn-Lovett
Tampa v. Murpbree 73 So.2d 287 (Fla. 1954).
Workmen's Compensation statutes fall into four general types as regards
the treatment of unlawfully employed minors.
Type one makes no provision for minors unlawfully employed. Under this
type statute, one group of decisions permits the minor to sue at law,' the
22. Elliot v. Haskins, 20 Cal. App. 2d 591, 67 P. 2d 698 (1937); Camden Country
Beverage Co. v. Blair, 46 F. 2d 648 (2d Cir. 1930); Kelleher v. Minshull, 11 Wash.
380, 119 P.2d 302 (1941).
23. See note 7 supra. See Matherne, Search and Seizure- U.S. v. Rabinowitz, 21
TENN. L. REV. (1951).
24. See note 9 supra.
25. People v. Fields, 15 N.Y.S. 2d 561 (1939); Marshall v. Commonwealth, 140
Va. 541, 125 S.E. 329, (1924); c/., Reininger v. State, 49 Okl. Crim. 463, 60 P.2d
629 (1936).
26. Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438,485 (1928).
1. Widdoes v. Laub, 33Del.4, 129 Art. 344 (1952); Lee v. Kansas City Public
Service Co., 137 Kan. 759, 22 P.2d 942 (1933); Win. B. Tilghman Co. v. Conway
150 Md. 525, 133 At. 593 (1926); Rock Island Coal Mining Co. v. Gilliam, 89 Oki.
49,213 Pac. 833 (1923); Knoxville News Co. v. Spitzer, 152 Tenn. 614, 279 SW 1043
(1926); Wlock v. Fort Drummer Mills, 98, Vt. 449, 129 Ad. 311 (1925).
